The nature of juristic paradigms : exploring the theoretical and conceptual relationship between adversarialism and therapeutic jurisprudence

Problem solving courts appear to achieve outcomes which are not common in mainstream courts. There are increasing calls for the adoption of more “therapeutic” and “problem solving” practices by mainstream judges in civil and criminal courts in a number of jurisdictions, most notably in the United States and Australia. Currently, a judge who sets out to exercise a significant therapeutic function is quite likely to be doing so in a specialist court or jurisdiction, outside the mainstream court system, and, arguably, from outside the adversarial paradigm itself. To some extent, his work is tolerated but marginalized. But do therapeutic and problem solving functions have the potential to define, rather than complement, the role of judicial officers? The basic question addressed in this paper is, therefore, whether the judicial role could evolve to be not just less adversarial, but fundamentally non-adversarial. In other words, could we see--or are we seeing--a paradigm shift not just in the colloquial, casual sense of the word, but in the strong, worldview changing sense meant by Thomas Kuhn?

Problem-solving courts, therapeutic jurisprudence and the constitution : if two is company, is three a crowd?

Court costs, resource-intensive trials, booming prison populations and the obduracy of recidivism rates all present as ugly excesses of the criminal law adversarial paradigm. To combat these excesses, problem-solving courts have evolved with an edict to address the underlying issues that have caused an individual to commit a crime. When a judge seeks to help a problem-solving court participant deal with issues like addiction, mental health or poverty, they are performing a very different role to that of a judicial officer in the traditional court hierarchy. They are no longer the removed, independent arbiter — a problem-solving court judge steps into the ‘arena’ with the participant and makes active use of their judicial authority to assist in rehabilitation and positive behavioural change. Problem-solving court judges employing the principles of therapeutic jurisprudence appreciate that their interaction with participants can have therapeutic and anti-therapeutic consequences. This article will consider how the deployment of therapeutic measures (albeit with good intention) can lead to the behavioural manifestation of partiality and bias on the part of problem-solving court judges. Chapter III of the Commonwealth Constitution will then be analysed to highlight why the operation and functioning of problem solving courts may be deemed unconstitutional. Part IV of this article will explain how a problem-solving court judge who is not acting impartially or independently will potentially contravene the requirements of the Constitution. It will finally be suggested that judges who possess a high level of emotional intelligence will be the most successful in administering an independent and impartial problem solving court.

Mainstreaming therapeutic jurisprudence and the adversarial paradigm—incommensurability and the possibility of a shared disciplinary matrix

Problem-solving courts appear to achieve outcomes that are not common in mainstream courts. There are increasing calls for the adoption of more therapeutic and problem-solving practices by mainstream judges in civil and criminal courts in a number of jurisdictions, most notably in the United States and Australia. Currently, a judge who sets out to exercise a significant therapeutic function is likely to be doing so in a specialist court or jurisdiction, outside the mainstream court system, and arguably, outside the adversarial paradigm itself. To some extent, this work is tolerated but marginalised. However, do therapeutic and problem-solving functions have the potential to help define, rather than simply complement, the role of judicial officers? The core question addressed in this thesis is whether the judicial role could evolve to be not just less adversarial, but fundamentally non-adversarial. In other words, could we see—or are we seeing—a juristic paradigm shift not just in the colloquial, casual sense of the word, but in the strong, worldview changing sense meant by Thomas Kuhn? This thesis examines the current relationship between adversarialism and therapeutic jurisprudence in the context of Kuhn’s conception of the transition from periods of ‘normal science’, through periods of anomaly and disciplinary crises to paradigm shifts. It considers whether therapeutic jurisprudence and adversarialism are incommensurable in the Kuhnian sense, and if so, what this means for the relationship between the two, and for the agenda to mainstream therapeutic jurisprudence. The thesis asserts that Kuhnian incommensurability is, in fact, a characteristic of the relationship between adversarialism and therapeutic jurisprudence, but that the possibility of a therapeutic paradigm shift in law can be reconciled with many adversarial and due process principles by relating this incommensurability to a broader disciplinary matrix.

Talking the talk : therapeutic jurisprudence and oral competence

In Australian criminal justice systems, a wide range of pathways to sentencing and punishment exist alongside traditional court processes. In particular, therapeutic jurisprudence ('TJ') processes have emerged during the last quarter of a century and now occupy a key position in the criminal justice landscape. This article provides an introduction to TJ, highlighting in particular the emphasis it places on the active participation of offenders, before critically discussing offenders' capacity to engage with TJ processes. The article then summarises the research on the oral competence of offenders, and argues that offenders who lack oral competence may be disadvantaged in TJ processes. Finally, we provide an overview of the limited guidance that has been provided to TJ practitioners on how to maximise the participation of offenders with limited oral competence.

When coroners care too much: Therapeutic jurisprudence and suicide findings

In common law countries such as England and Australia, violent and otherwise unnatural deaths are investigated by coroners who make findings as to the “manner of death”. This includes determining whether the deceased person intentionally caused their own death. Previous research (Tait and Carpenter 2013a, 2013b, 2014) has suggested that coroners are reluctant to reach such determinations, citing the stigma of suicide and a need for sensitivity to grieving and traumatized families. Based on interviews with both English and Australian coroners, this paper explores whether an ‘ethic of care’ evident in English and Australian coronial suicide determinations, can be understood as an application of the ‘practices and techniques’ of therapeutic jurisprudence. Based on the ways in which coroners position the law as a potential therapeutic agent, we investigate how they understand their role and position as legal actors, and the effects of their decision making in the context of suspected suicides.

Tolling for the luckless, the abandoned and forsaked : therapeutic jurisprudence and international human rights law as applied to prisoners and detainees by forensic psychologists

Objectives. There has been an explosion of interest in therapeutic jurisprudence as both a filter and lens for viewing the extent to which the legal system serves therapeutic or anti-therapeutic consequences. However, little attention has been paid to the impact of therapeutic jurisprudence on questions of international human rights law and the role of forensic psychologists. The paper aims to provide an intersection between human rights, therapeutic jurisprudence, and forensic psychology.

Method. Human rights are based on legal, social, and moral rules. Human rights literature generally considers legal rights but such policy statements do not provide principles to guide forensic psychologists in addressing moral or social rights. Therefore, a framework to guide forensic psychologists is required.

Conclusion. As duty-bearers, forensic psychologists need to address the core values of freedom and well-being in rights holders (in this instance, prisoners and detainees with a mental illness). The paper proposes that human rights principles can add to the normative base of a therapeutic jurisprudence framework, and in-turn, therapeutic jurisprudence can assist forensic psychologists to actively address human rights.

Where the home in valley meets the damp dirty prison : a human rights perspective on therapeutic jurisprudence and the rule of forensic psychologists in correctional settings

The roles of forensic psychologists in coerced environments such as corrections include that of treatment provider (for the offender) and that of organizational consultant (for the community). This dual role raises ethical issues between offender rights and community rights; an imbalance results in the violation of human rights. A timely reminder of a slippery ethical slope that can arise is the failure of the American Psychological Association to manage this balance regarding interrogation and torture of detainees under the Bush administration. To establish a “bright-line position” regarding ethical practice, forensic psychologists need to be cognizant of international human rights law. In this endeavor, international covenants and a universal ethical code ought to guide practice, although seemingly unresolveable conflicts between the law and ethics codes may arise. A solution to this problem is to devise an ethical framework that is based on enforceable universally shared human values regarding dignity and rights. To this end, the legal theory of therapeutic jurisprudence can assist psychologists to understand the law, the legal system, and their role in applying the law therapeutically to support offender dignity, freedom, and well-being. In this way, a moral stance is taken and the forensic role of treatment provider and/or organizational consultant is not expected to trump the prescriptions and the proscriptions of the law.

Therapeutic Jurisprudence, juvenile justice and the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child : do they coexist?

The UN Convention on the Rights of the Child provides children and young people with over 40 substantive rights, the five outcomes of which are living a healthy lifestyle, staying safe, enjoying and achieving, making a positive contribution, and economic wellbeing. Moreover, Article 3 dictates that all organizations concerned with children should work towards what is best of each child. It is not clear how these rights translate to the care of children and young people who come before the courts (particularly those who are subsequently incarcerated). A review of the literature suggests that while best practice guidelines for the treatment and rehabilitation of adult offenders has moved forward, there is little consensus about how this might be achieved for young people. Therapeutic Jurisprudence (TJ) needs to extend beyond its current considerations of the rights of children and young people, and to expand its focus to the extent to which international human rights standards are complied with in the cases of juveniles in the criminal justice system. This presentation will (a) explore the extent to which current practices in juvenile justice are consistent with the UN's Convention and (b) whether the adoption a rehabilitative and treatment approach based on a TJ framework might serve to improve outcomes for young people and ensure their rights are not being violated.

An examination of stakeholder attitudes and understanding of therapeutic jurisprudence in a mental health court

Mental health courts represent a key component of contemporary responses to mental illness and disability in the criminal justice system, and yet there is uncertainty about how these courts should balance their punishment and treatment roles. This paper reports an analysis of interviews with court professionals which considers their understanding of the rationale underpinning an Australian mental health court, its effectiveness in achieving its criminal justice and clinical goals, and of broader notions of therapeutic jurisprudence. This reveals considerable support for diversionary mental health court programs of this type and professional confidence that this type of program is effective. However, the analysis also highlights conflict in the practice frameworks of the different professional groups who regularly contribute to the operations of the court. Suggestions to enhance service delivery are offered.

Maximizing desistance: adding therapeutic jurisprudence and human rights to the mix

The law can be a systemically induced decision point for offenders and can act to help or hinder desistance. Desistance can be described as a change process that may be initiated by decisive momentum, supported by intervention, and maintained through re-entry, culminating in a citizen with full rights and responsibilities. Desistance within courts, corrections, and beyond is maximized by applying the law in a therapeutic manner. In common, desistance, therapeutic jurisprudence, and human rights support offender autonomy and well-being. The intersections between the three models have been explored to propose a normative framework that provides principles and offers strategies to address therapeutic legal rules, legal procedures, and the role of psycholegal actors and offenders in initiating, supporting, and maintaining desistance.

Suicide and the therapeutic coroner : inquests, governance and the grieving family

This study of English Coronial practice raises a number of questions about the role played by the Coroner within contemporary governance. Following observations at over 20 inquests into possible suicides and in-depth interviews with six Coroners, three preliminary issue emerged, all of which pointed to a broader and, in many ways, more significant issue. These preliminary issues are concerned with: (1) the existence of considerable slippages between different Coroners over which deaths are likely to be classified as suicide; (2) the high standard of proof required and immense pressure faced by Coroners from family members at inquest to reach any verdict other than suicide, which significantly depresses likely suicide rates, and; (3) Coroners feeling no professional obligation, either individually or collectively, to contribute to the production of consistent and useful social data regarding suicide, arguably rendering comparative suicide statistics relatively worthless. These concerns lead, ultimately, to the second more important question about the role expected of Coroners within social governance and within an effective, contemporary democracy. That is, are Coroners the principal officers in the public administration of death; or are they, first and foremost, a crucial part of the grieving process, one that provides important therapeutic interventions into the mental and emotional health of the community?

A therapeutic approach to assessing legal capacity in Australia

Australia lacks a satisfactory, national paradigm for assessing legal capacity in the context of testamentary, enduring power of attorney and advance care directive documents. Capacity assessments are currently conducted on an ad hoc basis by legal and/or medical professionals. The reliability of the assessment process is subject to the skill set and mutual understanding of the legal and/or medical professional conducting the assessment. There is a growth in the prevalence of diseases such as dementia. Such diseases impact upon cognition which increasingly necessitates collaboration between the legal and medical professions when assessing the effect of mentally disabling conditions upon legal capacity. Miscommunication and lack of understanding between legal and medical professionals involved could impede the development of a satisfactory paradigm. This article will discuss legal capacity assessment in Australia and how to strengthen the relationship between legal and medical professionals involved in capacity assessments. The development of a national paradigm would promote consistency and transparency of process, helping to improve the professional relationship and maximising the principles of autonomy, participation and dignity.

Antisocial personality disorder and therapeutic justice court programs

It has become commonplace for courts to supervise an offender as part of the sentencing process. Many of them have Anti Social Personality Disorder (ASPD). The focus of this article is how the work of specialist and/or problem solving courts can be informed by the insights of the psychology profession into the best practice in the treatment and management of people with ASPD. It is a legitimate purpose of legal work to consider and improve the well-being of the participants in the legal process. Programs designed specifically to deal with those with ASPD could be incorporated into existing Drug Courts, or implemented separately by courts to aid with reforming offenders with ASPD and in managing the re-entry of offenders into the community as part of their sentence. For the success of this initiative on the part of the court, ASPD will need to be specifically diagnosed and treated. Close co-operation between courts and psychologists is required to improve the effectiveness of court programs to treat people with ASPD and to evaluate their success.

Crime-prevention jurisprudence? A response to Andrews and Dowden

Recently Andrews and Dowden (2007) published an article proposing that both offender and victim well-being could be enhanced by utilizing the risk–need–responsivity model to guide the legal and court systems in crime prevention (rather than therapy). Consequently, crime-prevention jurisprudence (defined as a law-and-justice objective reflecting the language of personality and social psychology) was proposed as an alternative to therapeutic jurisprudence (defined as a mental-health objective reflecting the clinical language of forensic mental health). The authors erroneously claim that therapeutic jurisprudence is a mental-health concept whose aim is to provide therapy that improves well-being in offenders rather than to demonstrate concern for victims. In fact, therapeutic jurisprudence is a legal concept that utilizes social-science knowledge to highlight the therapeutic and anti-therapeutic impacts of the law, legal procedures, and legal roles on all individuals, including victims. This article will respond to Andrews and Dowden by challenging three assumptions they make regarding the role of therapeutic jurisprudence. This response concludes that the focus of offender rehabilitation should be on enhancing community protection by balancing offender rights and victim rights. Therapeutic jurisprudence already provides such a framework and, therefore, the promise of crime-prevention jurisprudence fails to add value.